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Abstract
This paper considers how the multinational corporations transfer price re-
sponds to changes in international corporate effective tax rates. It extends the
decentralized decision-making analysis of transfer pricing in the context of dif-
ferent tax rates. It adopts and extends Bonds (1980) model of the decentralized
multinational corporation that assumes centralized transfer pricing. The direc-
tion of transfer price change is as expected, while the magnitude of change is
likely to be less than predicted by the Horst (1971), centralized decision-making
model. The paper extends the model further by assuming negotiated transfer
pricing, where the analysis is partitioned into perfect and imperfect information
cases. The negotiated transfer pricing result reverts to the Horst (1971), or cen-
tralized decision-making, result, under perfect information. Under imperfect in-
formation, the centralized decision-making result obtains when top management
successfully informs division general managers or it successfully implements a
non-monetary reward scheme to encourage division general managers to cooper-
ate. Under simplifying assumptions, centralized decision-making dominates de-
centralized decision-making, while negotiated transfer pricing weakly dominates
centralized transfer pricing.
The contents of this article are the opinions of the writers and do not necessar-
ily represent the position of the Internal Revenue Service.
I. Introduction 
Profit-maximizing multinational corporations choose their transfer prices in connection 
with international tax rates, since transfer prices influence global after-tax profit. Transfer 
prices also concern the tax authorities, since they influence a country’s tax revenue. The 
transfer price values the good or service traded between divisions of a multinational 
corporation (related parties) and, therefore, reflects the interplay of internal corporate 
forces rather than (or in addition to) external market forces. The transfer price may equal 
the market (arm’s-length) price by choice, by coincidence, or through the exertion of 
external market forces. The arm’s-length price measures the market price, or range of 
market prices1, that unrelated firms would use under the same (or similar) facts and 
circumstances as the multinational corporation’s internal transaction. To the extent that a 
multinational corporation can adjust the transfer price, either within the arm’s-length 
range or outside the arm’s-length range under non-compliance2, it can use the transfer 
price to improve its global after-tax profit. For example, when effective international 
corporate tax rates differ, the multinational corporation can manipulate the transfer price 
on intra-firm transactions to shift (at least some) profit to the relatively low-tax country. 
This rational behavior reduces the multinational corporation’s global tax burden and 
increases its global after-tax profit. Since the transfer price shifts taxable income from 
one country to another, there is a zero-sum effect on reported income in each country. 
Therefore, if a multinational corporation adjusts its transfer price within the arm’s-length 
range (outside the arm’s-length range), taxable profit in the high-tax country is lower 
(taxable profit attributable to its business activity in the high-tax country is under-
                                                     
1 In practice, the arm’s-length price is a range of prices that satisfies the transfer pricing 
regulations. 
2 Tax avoidance is the minimization of one’s tax burden to the extent allowed by law, which 
reflects tax law compliance. Tax evasion is the minimization of one’s tax burden beyond the 
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reported) and higher (over-reported) in the low-tax country. Given the importance of the 
relationship between tax rates and the multinational corporation’s transfer price, our 
central concern is how multinational corporations adjust the transfer price when relative 
international tax rates change. 
When tax rates differ, the multinational corporation wants to manipulate the 
transfer price to shift profit to the low-tax country. Under centralized decision-making, the 
multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price to either the highest or lowest 
allowable transfer price, the arm’s-length price, which is an exogenous constraint that is 
imposed by the tax authorities. This assumes the arm’s-length constraint is an effective 
or strict constraint. In addition, the centralized multinational corporation chooses the 
firm-wide optimal output level. This is the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making, 
result. Under a weaker or less effective arm’s-length constraint, non-compliance is 
possible and the centralized multinational corporation might choose a transfer price that 
lies outside the arm’s-length range. 
Centralized decision-making does not generally describe the operations of 
multinational corporations, however. Top management delegates some degree of 
decision-making authority to division general managements, while retaining other 
decisions. Therefore, decentralized decision-making more closely characterizes the 
dispersion of decision-making authority in the multinational corporation. Decentralized 
decision-making distinguishes between top management and division general 
management and provides a context for a meaningful examination of the principal-agent 
relationship between them. An agency-theory framework underlies the decentralized 
model. Division general managements maximize division profit because it affects their 
compensation. That reward scheme corrects the agency problems (agency costs) that 
                                                                                                                                                              
extent allowed by law, which reflects non-compliance with tax law. Non-compliance may also be 
the result of taxpayer miscalculation or mistake. 
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associate with the delegation of authority.3 The decentralized decision-making 
assumption also permits a comparative static analysis with respect to the transfer price. 
Since the model specifies the quantity of intra-firm trade to depend on the transfer price, 
top management’s first-order condition defines the optimal transfer price. 
We adopt Bond’s (1980) specification of the decentralized multinational 
corporation, and complete the comparative static analysis that he began. He assumes 
centralized transfer pricing, which means that top management chooses the transfer 
price while division general managements choose the quantity of intra-firm trade and the 
multinational corporation’s output. The comparative static results support our intuitive 
understanding of the relationship between tax rates and the transfer price. When tax 
rates differ, the transfer price shifts profit from the high-tax division to the low-tax division 
to maximize the multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, subject to an effective 
arm’s-length constraint. The optimal transfer price may be an interior solution rather than 
the arm’s-length price, however. 
When firms adjust the transfer price to minimize their tax burden, the centralized 
multinational corporation might adjust its transfer price to a price outside the arm’s-
length range. The decentralized multinational corporation also might set the transfer 
price outside the arm’s-length range, but it is more likely to choose a transfer price 
closer to the arm’s-length boundary, because of the decentralized multinational 
corporation’s internal constraints. Therefore, if multinational corporations are 
decentralized, the degree of compliance with the transfer pricing regulations is likely to 
be more than that predicted by the centralized Horst (1971) model. 
                                                     
3 Underlying the assumption that top management maximizes the multinational corporation’s 
profit, which is the shareholders’ goal, is a perfect board of directors or another means to correct 
the agency problems between shareholders and top management. 
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We extend the model to consider negotiated transfer pricing under perfect and 
imperfect information, where division general managements choose the transfer price 
(as well as the multinational corporation’s output). With perfect information, division 
general managements know that their negotiation is a positive-sum game. Therefore, 
cooperation dominates a negotiation impasse and the Horst (1971) result emerges; the 
transfer price equals the arm’s-length price (under tax law compliance) and the firm-wide 
optimal output is chosen. With imperfect information, top management must either 
facilitate the division general managements’ learning that the game is positive-sum or 
implement a non-monetary reward scheme to promote cooperation. If successful, 
division general managements cooperate and the Horst (1971) solution emerges, but if 
not successful, a negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, top 
management sets the transfer price and the centralized transfer pricing solution 
emerges. 
Our decentralized decision-making analysis shows that centralized decision-
making dominates decentralized decision-making when tax rates differ, but centralized 
decision-making is not generally applicable to the multinational corporation. In the 
context of decentralized decision-making and different tax rates, top management 
weakly prefers negotiated transfer pricing to centralized transfer pricing, since the profit 
potential under negotiated transfer pricing is greater. Also, a comparison of centralized 
and negotiated transfer pricing shows that the transfer price is sensitive to who sets it. 
An interior solution is more likely under centralized transfer pricing, while the Horst 
(1971) solution – a boundary solution – is more likely under negotiated transfer pricing 
(assuming an effective arm’s-length constraint). 
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II. Literature Review 
A General Framework 
The following model provides a general framework to discuss the existing literature on 
transfer pricing as well as the model in Section III. The multinational corporation has two 
divisions – the parent company in the home country (country 1) and its wholly owned 
subsidiary that is located in and incorporated under the laws of the foreign country 
(country 2). Trade flows from the parent to the subsidiary, where this intra-firm trade 
reflects the multinational corporation’s horizontal or vertical integration strategy. The 
multinational corporation maximizes its global after-tax profit, subject to effective 
constraints. The global after-tax or net profit is: 
fcdcdc
N te
t 2211 )1(
1)1( Π−+Π−=Π , 
where  is the domestic currency value of the parent division’s before-tax profit, Π  
is the foreign currency value of the subsidiary division’s before-tax profit,  and  are 
country 1’s and 2’s effective corporate income tax rates, respectively, and  is the 
foreign currency price of the domestic currency. Furthermore, 
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where the parent produces good 1 ( ), a tangible intermediate product, the subsidiary 
produces good 2 (Y ), a tangible final product,
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2
4  equals the quantity of good 1 
produced,  equals the quantity of good 1 sold in country 1 at the market price , 
 equals the quantity of good 1 sold to the subsidiary in country 2 (this is the quantity 
of intra-firm trade, which is invoiced and sold at an internal transfer price of ), 
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By convention, the subsidiary possesses a fixed coefficient production function 
with the coefficient equal to 1; it takes one unit of  to produce one unit of Y , so 
. In addition, no outside market for the intermediate good exists, so that 
 and . Also, the subsidiary’s output market exhibits perfect competition, 
so that 
12X 2
121
. Finally, let . Therefore, the general model reduces to: 
221 ))1( Π−=Π t ,      (1) 
)1212XPΠ , and      (2) 
1212122 XPXP −Π .     (3) 
All variables now are in domestic currency units, since 1=e . 
Centralized Decision-Making 
Horst (1971) models the centralized multinational corporation and its transfer pricing. 
The basic model in equations (1), (2), and (3) are modified to incorporate the following 
assumptions. Horst assumes the multinational corporation faces an import tariff or duty 
in country 2, , on the quantity of intra-firm trade, and the multinational corporation d
                                                                                                                                                              
X
4 If the subsidiary simply resells good 1 in country 2, good 2 is a tangible intermediate product, 
say . 
5 If the subsidiary is a reseller, 2  is its processing (i.e., packaging, modifying, etc.) cost. 
6  dcfc PeP 1212 ⋅=
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exhibits horizontal integration. The subsidiary resells  as good 2, , and produces 
part of  itself, . Thus, the subsidiary’s before-tax profit is: 
12X 2X
2X 22X
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where ,  equals the subsidiary’s on-site cost of producing the 
intermediate good, and  equals the subsidiary’s import cost including the 
tariff. To simplify, let . Horst assumes that the subsidiary’s processing cost (
1222X=
2d
22C
1( d+
0=
12122 ) XP
2γ ) is 
zero. Thus, equation (3) becomes 
1212222222 )( XPXCX −−Π .7     (4) 
Centralized decision-making in the multinational corporation means that the 
quantity of intra-firm trade does not depend on the transfer price. Centralized decision-
making can be characterized as one of the following: (i) The owner-operated 
multinational corporation possesses no principal-agent problems, and the owner 
chooses the transfer price and quantity of intra-firm trade to maximize ; (ii) Top 
management of the multinational corporation chooses the transfer price and quantity of 
intra-firm trade to maximize , and no principal-agent problems exist
NΠ
NΠ 8 so that division 
general management follows top management’s instructions perfectly;9 or (iii) The 
multinational corporation is the traditional neoclassical firm, or “black box,” with no 
decision-makers and agency relationships and the firm chooses the transfer price and 
the quantity of intra-firm trade to maximize NΠ . Since the multinational corporation 
                                                     
7 Horst (1971) assumes that the subsidiary sells its final good in an imperfectly competitive 
market. It is assumed here that the subsidiary sells in a perfectly competitive market. This 
assumption does not change Horst’s conclusion, however. 
8 Agency costs are zero because top management has implemented a perfect management 
control system that corrects all principal-agent problems. 
9 In this scenario, there are three decision-making entities in the multinational corporation: Top 
management, the parent division general management, and the subsidiary division general 
management. 
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operates in different countries, top management typically delegates decision-making 
authority to division general managements and a principal-agent relationship exists 
between them. Therefore, the centralized decision-making assumption implies the 
existence of a perfect management control system that provides the incentives for 
division general managements to pursue top management’s goal. The parent and 
subsidiary division general managements make decisions at the division level that are 
consistent with what top management wants, which effectively and perfectly centralizes 
decisions. Thus, top management chooses both the transfer price and the multinational 
corporation’s output to maximize NΠ . When it changes the transfer price, each division 
general management does not respond by changing the quantity of the intra-firm good 
supplied or demanded. 
(1−+
Horst (1971) considers how the multinational corporation’s transfer price 
responds to changes in tax rates by rearranging the multinational corporation’s, or top 
management’s, objective function as follows: 
( )[ ] )[ ]{ } ( ) 12121222222111 XPttCXPtCtN −+−−−=Π .  (5) 
Focusing on the last term in equation (5), when  (12 tt > 12 tt < ), top management chooses 
the highest (lowest) allowable transfer price to maximize NΠ , given its optimal choice of 
. The multinational corporation is implicitly constrained by the arm’s-length price, an 
external constraint imposed by the tax authorities that is effective and binding.  
12X
Decentralized Decision-Making 
Hirshleifer (1956, 1964) considers the domestic divisionalized firm and its transfer 
pricing. He assumes decentralized decision-making, where division general 
managements negotiate the transfer price (negotiated transfer pricing) and respond to 
changes in the transfer price by adjusting the quantity of the intra-firm good supplied or 
demanded. Bond (1980) extends Hirshliefer’s (1956, 1964) decentralized domestic firm 
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to the multinational case, where top management chooses the transfer price (centralized 
transfer pricing). 
In Hirshleifer (1956, 1964) and in Bond (1980), the quantity of intra-firm good 
trade depends on the parent’s supply and the subsidiary’s demand. Bond (1980) 
formally develops the supply and demand relationships. Given the transfer price set by 
top management, each division general management determines its optimal trade. The 
parent’s and subsidiary’s maximization problems and first-order conditions are given as 
follows: 
( )
12
12
111
PX
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s
Π− ,  ( )[ ] 01 '1121 =−− CPt   (parent) 
( )
12
12
221
PX
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d
Π− ,  ( )[ ] 01 12'222 =−−− PPt γ , (subsidiary) 
where  and  (marginal costs) are the derivatives of  and '1C
'
2γ 1C 2γ  with respect to  
and , respectively. Taking the total differentials of the first-order conditions gives the 
slope of the supply curve, 
sX12
d
12X
0''1*
12
12 >=C
dX
dP
s
 (increasing marginal cost), and the slope of the 
demand curve, 0''2*
12
12 <−= γ
d
dP
''
1
''
2γ−
dX
 (increasing marginal processing cost). Bond (1980) and 
we assume that C  and  are constants. Graphically, the multinational corporation’s 
internal market is shown in Figure 1.  
Equilibrium occurs in the internal market when top management sets the transfer 
price at . It sets the transfer price at  only when 012P
0
12P 21 tt = .10 The short-side rule 
                                                     
10 When , no reason exists to use the transfer price to shift profit from one country to 
another. Top management is free to set the transfer price to induce autonomous division general 
managements to choose the optimum quantity of intra-firm trade (and output), which it does at 
21 tt =
 10
applies, so that when top management raises (lowers) the transfer price from , the 
multinational corporation is along the upper (lower) portion of the demand (supply) 
curve. 
0
12P
In Bond’s (1980) model, top management chooses the transfer price to maximize 
, given the division supply and demand relationships. Formally, top management’s 
maximization problem is 
NΠ
)(),( 1212121212 PXPX
NP ds
MaxΠ
0
12
. Bond (1980) calculates top management’s 
first-order condition and evaluates it at the equilibrium transfer price, . The first-order 
condition evaluated at  is: 
0
12P
P
)( 12
0
12
12 0
1212
ttX
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d
PP
N −=Π
=
.      (6) 
From equation (6), Bond concludes that when  ( t12 tt > 12 t< ), top management raises 
(lowers) the transfer price from  to maximize 012P NΠ , which is consistent with Horst’s 
(1971) conclusion.  
In Horst (1971), when tax rates differ the centralized multinational corporation 
raises or lowers the transfer price by the maximum amount allowed by tax law. How 
much does top management in Bond’s (1980) decentralized multinational corporation 
raise or lower the transfer price? Bond answers this question by deriving the optimal 
markup and markdown conditions. The optimal markup rate is 
)1(
)(
1
12
12
'
112
t
tt
P
CP
−
−=− η , 
and the optimal markdown rate is 
                                                                                                                                                              
0
12P . Since  and the short-side rule applies,  is the quantity that maximizes Π . 
Also, see Appendix 3 for the derivation of the tax conditions. 
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ε  is the parent’s transfer price elasticity of supply of . Bond 
concludes that when t  ( t
12X
1t> 12 t< ), the optimal markup (markdown) depends on the 
relative magnitude of the tax differential and the transfer price elasticity of demand 
(supply). 
Bond’s (1980) analysis raises the possibility of an interior solution for the transfer 
price. Under centralized decision-making, division general managements do not reduce 
the quantity of intra-firm trade (and output), so the multinational corporation chooses the 
highest or lowest allowable transfer price — a boundary solution. Under decentralized 
decision-making, division general managements may lower the quantity of intra-firm 
trade (and output) in response to a change in the transfer price. In that case, top 
management trades off the gain in NΠ  that comes from profit-shifting (minimizing its 
global tax bill) with the loss in NΠ  that comes from a loss in efficiency (resource 
misallocation). This tradeoff makes an interior solution within the arm’s-length boundary 
possible. Top management, limited by the possible adverse effect of a fall in intra-firm 
trade on the multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, may adjust the transfer 
price by something less than the maximum allowed by tax law. 
III. Comparative Static Analysis 
Centralized Transfer Pricing 
We begin by adopting Bond’s (1980) decentralized model of the multinational 
corporation and completing the comparative static analysis. In Bond (1980), 
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decentralized decision-making means that top management chooses the transfer price 
(centralized transfer pricing) to maximize the multinational corporation’s global after-tax 
profit, while division general managements choose division output to maximize division 
after-tax profit. We then conclude with the implications of negotiated transfer pricing. 
Model and Analysis 
We expand Bond’s (1980) results for the vertically integrated multinational corporation 
by completing the comparative static analysis for 
1
*
12
dt
dP  and 
2
*
12
dt
dP
)12
. Bond’s (1980) model 
appears in equations (1), (2), and (3), where  and  when the 
multinational corporation operates along the internal supply curve, and  
and  when it operates along the internal demand curve. Top management’s first-
order condition implicitly defines the optimal transfer price. The total differential of the 
first-order condition is used to calculate the comparative static results, which are as 
follows: 
(1212 PXX
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D
XXPP
dt
dP γ ,     (8) 
where .01 <D 11 These results apply whether the multinational corporation operates 
along the internal supply or the internal demand curve.12 
                                                     
11 Appendix 1 derives the results. The results in equations (7) and (8) generalize to non-linear 
marginal cost curves that produce non-linear internal supply and demand curves. With non-linear 
marginal cost curves, the denominator in equation (7) and (8) is  rather than , and the 
second-order condition is . See Appendix 1. Therefore, profit maximization implies 
that . The results in equations (7) and (8) are qualitatively consistent when  
replaces . 
CC 1D
CCPN =Π )( 12''
0)( 12
'' <=Π CCPN
1D
CC
12 Appendix 2 determines the signs of the results. 
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These results confirm our intuitive understanding of the relationship between 
international tax rates and the multinational corporation’s transfer price. The transfer 
price can be used to shift profits to the lower-tax country to reduce the multinational 
corporation’s global tax liability and improve its corporate after-tax profit. For example, 
when the multinational corporation operates along the supply or demand curve, an 
increase in country 1’s tax rate leads the profit-maximizing multinational corporation to 
reduce the transfer price. This shifts some profit to the subsidiary in country 2, reduces 
the multinational corporation’s global tax liability, and thereby increases its global after-
tax profit. 
Internal Profit Constraint and an Interior Solution 
In Horst (1971), if the multinational corporation does not face an external arm’s-length 
constraint (or if the arm’s-length constraint is less than perfectly effective and not 
binding), it adjusts the transfer price to a level that shifts all of the high-tax division’s 
profit to the low-tax division (Schjelderup and Sørgard 1995). In that case, the high-tax 
division earns zero profit. Under decentralized decision-making, the multinational 
corporation faces a different internal profit constraint; no division earns zero (or 
negative) before-tax profit when the multinational corporation earns a before-tax profit.13 
This ensures that not all of the high-tax division’s profit shifts to the low-tax division, even 
if the multinational corporation does not face a binding arm’s-length constraint. This 
occurs because top management, under decentralized decision-making, must balance 
the profit-shifting gain with the possible resource allocation loss when changing the 
                                                     
13 Schjelderup and Sørgard (1995) suggest that the internal profit constraint of zero is an 
appropriate amendment to the Horst (1971) centralized decision-making model, but for a different 
reason than discussed in this paper. They argue that, since a negative profit cannot be 
repatriated to the parent corporation, the multinational corporation does not adjust the transfer 
price by a magnitude that makes the high-tax division earn less than zero profit. This argument 
does not consider the fact that some countries allow multinational corporations to carry a loss 
that is earned in one fiscal year forward (or backward) as a credit toward their tax liability in a 
future (or past) fiscal year, however. 
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transfer price. The reasoning is as follows. Top management of the vertically integrated 
multinational corporation cannot choose the transfer price that makes the high-tax 
division earn too small a profit, or else too little production occurs. Since the division 
production functions interconnect in the vertically integrated multinational corporation 
(i.e., Y ), the high-tax division must produce a large enough division output so that 
the multinational corporation’s output and after-tax profit are sufficiently positive. The 
high-tax division only produces when the transfer price allows it to earn a profit. 
Therefore, the decentralized multinational corporation’s profit-maximizing strategy differs 
from the centralized multinational corporation’s, since it maximizes after-tax profit only 
when the autonomous divisions have the incentive to produce sufficient output. The 
decentralized multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price by less than the 
centralized multinational corporation when the arm’s-length constraint does not bind, 
which limits the profit shift. 
122 X=
Mathematically, the multinational corporation faces a critical upper and a lower 
transfer price (  and ). Figure 2 illustrates. The profit-maximizing multinational 
corporation does not set the transfer price outside, or at, these critical values. If the 
arm’s-length constraint does not bind (i.e., the arm’s-length boundary lies outside, or on, 
the multinational corporation’s critical upper and lower transfer prices), the multinational 
corporation shifts less profit than, or the same profit as, the tax authorities will allow.
CUP12
CLP12
14 
Negotiated Transfer Pricing 
In the centralized transfer pricing analysis, we implicitly assume that top management 
knows each division’s “reaction-function” (i.e., the parent’s supply curve and the 
subsidiary’s demand curve). Therefore, centralized transfer pricing with its underlying 
perfect-information assumption may involve an internal contradiction, however. The 
                                                     
14 Appendix 4 derives the critical upper and lower transfer prices. 
 15
assumption that top management chooses the optimal transfer price implicitly assumes 
that top management has perfect information about its divisions. But, if top management 
has perfect information about each division, then no need exists to structure the firm in a 
decentralized manner (Hansen and Kimbrell 1991). Top management makes all 
decisions from the center and division general managements follow instructions 
perfectly, since an all-knowing top management successfully corrects shirking and self-
interested behavior without cost. Therefore, “impacted information”15 underlies a firm’s 
choice to decentralize and imperfect information is consistent with decentralized 
decision making. 
Perhaps no contradiction exists, however. Consider two arguments. First, 
negotiated transfer pricing contradicts and, in fact, nullifies the multinational 
corporation’s vertical (or horizontal) integration strategy. Under negotiated transfer 
pricing in the decentralized model, the multinational corporation becomes a union of 
completely independent businesses—a conglomerate. Top management must exercise 
at least some central control or the firm disintegrates. Since only two choice variables 
exist, the transfer price and output, top management must retain control over at least 
one. As in Bond (1980), top management controls the transfer price. 
Second, even under negotiated transfer pricing, top management still chooses 
the management control system and the transfer pricing policy. That is, although 
autonomous division general managements directly choose the transfer price through 
negotiation, the profit-maximizing top management chooses the transfer pricing policy 
that it expects to yield the transfer price that maximizes the multinational corporation’s 
                                                     
15 Williamson (1975) defines impacted information as an information asymmetry that cannot be 
resolved at low cost. With respect to the agency relationship between top management and 
division general management, division general managements have division information that top 
management cannot learn at low cost. 
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global after-tax profit. Under negotiated transfer pricing, top management indirectly 
chooses the transfer price. Therefore, centralized transfer pricing is a strategic 
simplification that is consistent with negotiated transfer pricing.16 
Nevertheless, since negotiated transfer pricing exists in practice (Tang 1979, Wu 
and Sharp 1979, Price Waterhouse 1984, Eccles 1985, Chalos and Haka 1990), we 
relax the centralized transfer pricing assumption and consider negotiated transfer 
pricing. The analysis considers two cases. Each division general management either has 
perfect or imperfect information about whether the negotiation is a positive-sum game. 
The transfer price negotiation is a simultaneous game, since the negotiated outcome (an 
agreement), once concluded, is a mutual and joint decision. Also, the negotiation is a 
repeated game, since repeated interaction between division general managements in 
the multinational corporation is common. 
Perfect Information. Under negotiated transfer pricing, a cooperative solution (i.e., an 
agreement prior to the end of the negotiation period) occurs when rational profit-
maximizing division general managements realize that they play a positive-sum game. 
Division general managements receive rewards based on division profit, so as rational 
decision-makers they maximize division profit. The game between division general 
managements possesses a positive-sum, which means that a higher after-negotiation 
profit exists for at least one division while the other division’s after-negotiation profit is 
not lower. If the relatively weaker bargaining division general management faces a 
probable negotiation outcome that lowers its profit (and therefore its compensation), it 
vetoes the other division general management’s offer. Unless the stronger bargaining 
                                                     
16 This argument ignores the fact that top management cannot control autonomous division 
general managements perfectly. It also ignores the fact that negotiated transfer pricing may 
influence the multinational corporation’s after-tax profit through other avenues besides inducing 
division general managements to choose the centralized transfer price. 
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division general management presents another offer that leaves the vetoing division 
general management with at least its before-negotiation profit (conflict payoff), a 
negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, each division general 
management receives the profit that it started with, its conflict payoff, or lower.17 If the 
relatively stronger division general management offers a concession that makes the 
weaker division general management at least not worse off, a cooperative outcome 
occurs where the stronger division receives at least some gain in its after-tax profit while 
the weaker division receives at least its conflict payoff. A concession leads to 
cooperation and some gain for the stronger division general management, which 
dominates no gain or a loss. 
The bargaining sequence occurs in a two stages. In stage one, division general 
managements first cooperate and choose the transfer price and quantity of intra-firm 
trade. If an agreement does not emerge before the end of the negotiation period, top 
management steps in and sets the transfer price (centralized transfer pricing). Therefore, 
cooperation weakly dominates a negotiation impasse,18 and a cooperative solution 
obtains. In stage two, the two divisions divide the joint gain in after-tax profit, if any. 
Since the bargaining outcome reflects each party’s relative bargaining power (Chalos 
                                                     
17 Top management steps in and chooses the transfer price if a negotiation impasse occurs. In 
effect, negotiation impasse leads the centralized transfer pricing result. 
 
18 Let “*” indicate the optimum result under centralized transfer pricing. With a negotiation 
impasse, top management chooses the transfer price, , which may lie inside the arm’s-length 
boundary. With cooperation, division general managements negotiate a transfer price, , at 
the upper- or lower-arm’s-length boundary,  and  respectively (this will be shown later). 
With an impasse, centralized transfer pricing occurs and the quantity of intra-firm trade is 
determined by the short-side rule, so that when , . With cooperation, division 
general managements choose . Therefore, the cooperation solution,  or 
 and , weakly dominates the non-cooperative solution,  and 
. 
*
12P
LALP12
0
12P
.
12
NegP
UALP12=
LALP12
UALP12
*
12P
>
<−
0
12
*
12 XX ≤
0
12
.
12 XX
Neg = NegP .12
P *12 ≥LALP12
*
12X ≤
0
12
.
12 XX
Neg = UALP12 ≥
0
12X
 18
and Haka 1990, Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987, Abdel-Khalik and Lusk 1974, and 
Dopuch and Drake 1964), the generalized Nash bargaining solution allocates the joint 
gain. Specifically, the relative bargaining strength of division general managements 
determines the allocation. 
Division general managements’ joint after-tax division profit equals the 
multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, NΠ . Therefore, in stage one, division 
general managements maximize their joint gain by choosing the highest (lowest) 
allowable transfer price when 21 tt <  ( t ), ceteris paribus, which is the upper (lower) 
arm’s-length boundary,  ( = ). In addition, they choose the equilibrium 
quantity of intra-firm trade, , since it maximizes their joint gain, ceteris 
paribus. In a positive-sum negotiation under perfect information, rational division general 
managements, who face an incentive system that rewards them based on division 
performance, choose a negotiated transfer price at the upper- or lower-arm’s-length 
boundary and the centralized output, which is the Horst (1971) or centralized decision-
making solution. 
21 t>
LALP12
0
12X
UALP12=
.
12X
Neg =
NegP .12
In stage two, the generalized Nash bargaining solution captures how division 
general managements divide the joint gain (see Sopher 1993). Let Π  measure the 
cooperative joint gain in after-tax division profit, where 
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The joint gain is restricted to being greater than or equal to zero, since profit-maximizing 
assumption rules out a negotiation impasse.19 The generalized Nash bargaining solution 
                                                     
19 Under imperfect information, Π . 0.. ><−
GJ
N
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is as follows: Player A receives share X  of  and player B receives share  
of . If player A and B do not cooperate, , and each player ends up with its 
conflict payoff or lower. 
..GJ
NΠ
.Π GJN
XGJN −Π ..
..GJ
NΠ 0. ≤
The generalized Nash bargaining problem “maximize[s] the weighted product of 
utility gains received by the two players to the bargain” (Sopher 1993, p. 70). Each 
player’s utility equals its share of the joint gain, X  and , respectively. Let XGJN −Π .. γ  be 
the parent division general management’s bargaining power, where its complete 
dominance (impotence) in the negotiation is denoted by 1=γ  ( 0=γ ). Similarly, let 
( )γβ −= 1
( ) 11 =−
 be the subsidiary division general management’s bargaining power, where 
γ  ( )[ 01 =− ]γ  denotes its complete dominance (impotence).20 An increase in the 
parent division general management’s absolute bargaining power matches an equal 
decrease in the subsidiary division general management’s absolute bargaining power, or 
( ) 1−=γ1−=
γ
β
γ
d
d
d
d . By convention, the maximization problem that represents the 
generalized Nash bargaining process is 
( ) ( )  −Π⋅ −γγ 1.. XXMax GJNX ,21 
which produces the following bargaining solution:  (the parent’s share) and ..* GJNX Π= γ
( ) ( ) ..*.. 1 GJNGJN X Π−=−Π γ  (the subsidiary’s share).22 That is, the bargaining outcome 
                                                     
20 That is, ( 10 ≤≤ γ ). 
21 See Nash (1950, 1953) for his theoretical presentation of the bargaining process. Also see 
others who use the generalized Nash bargaining solution in economic applications (e.g., Hoel 
1991, Linhart et al. 1989). In this paper, the objective function is maximized subject to the implicit 
constraint that  and ( ){ } 01 11 ≥Π− td ( ){ } 01 22 ≥Π− td . 
22 When analyzing the second stage of negotiation, “*” refers to the optimum allocation of the joint 
gain. 
 20
allocates the joint gain in division after-tax profit according to each division general 
management’s relative bargaining power as follows: 
( ) ( ) ....*..*.. 1 GJNGJNGJNGJN XX Π−+Π=−Π+=Π γγ .   (9) 
For a domestic firm, Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) show that division general 
managements first cooperate and choose their output jointly at the firm’s optimal output 
level and the transfer price allocates the gain. In the domestic case, the transfer price 
does not affect the firm’s after-tax profit, so it can allocate the gain in stage two of the 
negotiation without affecting the firm’s after-tax profit. In contrast, Halperin and Srinidhi 
(1991) analyze the case of the multinational corporation that faces different tax rates. 
Like Hansen and Kimbrell (1991), they conclude that the transfer price allocates the 
gain. In that case, global after-tax profit responds to a change in the transfer price. 
Therefore, no guarantee exists that division general managements will choose a 
negotiated transfer price on the arm’s-length boundary, since division general 
managements’ relative bargaining powers determine the allocation of the joint gain. Only 
in the special case where their relative bargaining powers lead to a negotiated transfer 
price at the arm’s-length boundary is the joint gain in division after-tax profit (and the 
multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit) maximized. 
In the multinational case under different tax rates, the assumption that the 
transfer price allocates the joint gain is not consistent with the assumption that division 
general managements maximize profit. Division general managements should choose 
the upper- or lower-arm’s-length transfer price in stage one of their negotiation, and then 
use another mechanism to allocate the gain in stage two. That is, the negotiated transfer 
price allocates before-tax profit between divisions in a way that satisfies the arm’s length 
constraint. Therefore, the before-tax (taxable) profits reported on the parent’s and 
subsidiary’s tax returns reflect compliance with tax law. Then division general 
managements implement their stage two allocation of the joint gain in after-tax profit 
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between themselves using another means, instead of the transfer price. This allocation 
need require actual money payments between divisions.23 Since division general 
managements receive rewards based on division performance, division general 
managements communicate the negotiated allocation of the joint gain and the resulting 
division of after-tax profits to top management. Top management then compensates 
division general managements based on that information. To do so, it calculates 
alternative division profit measures, for internal purposes only, that are based on the 
information communicated by division general managements. Top management then 
enters those profits into the corporation’s management compensation formula, so that 
division general managements’ quarterly or yearly bonus properly reflects the negotiated 
allocation of the joint gain. 
Imperfect Information. Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) point out that even though “the 
assumption of complete information may be reasonable, there is certainly a need for 
additional research to assess the impact of relaxing the assumption” (p. 96).24 That 
assumption is relaxed here. Under imperfect information, division general managements 
may not know that their negotiation is a positive-sum game. Therefore, believing that the 
game is zero-sum, the dominant division general management exercises its full 
                                                     
23 If actual money payments allocate the gain between divisions, those payments may be subject 
to taxation. 
 
24 Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) present three reasons why complete information between the 
division general managements makes good sense: (1) Top management has the incentive to 
assimilate the information to encourage division general managements to choose the centralized 
outcome; (2) division general managements are “reasonably informed about their division’s 
operating environment even without information being supplied by a central authority” (p. 88); and 
(3) since division general managements can communicate with each other and they are rational 
and profit-maximizing, they have the capability and the incentive to identify joint cooperative gains 
when they exist (pp. 87-88). 
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bargaining strength to negotiate the most favorable transfer price possible.25 Since the 
relatively weaker bargaining division general management is made worse off by 
accepting the dominant division general management’s offer, it rejects the offer. In fact, 
since the game is perceived as zero-sum, every offer that makes the stronger division 
general management better off seems to make the weaker division general management 
worse off. The weaker division general management rejects every offer and a 
negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, top management sets the 
transfer price and the centralized transfer pricing result obtains. 
Under imperfect information, top management can facilitate division general 
managements’ learning that their negotiation is positive-sum. For example, Hansen and 
Kimbrell (1991) suggest that top management can take on “the role of supplying 
information to managers” [italics in original] (p. 88) by telling them directly.26 If division 
general managements believe top management, then they become aware of the 
opportunity to achieve a mutual gain and, in the pursuit of their self-interest (maximum 
division profit), they cooperate. The perfect information solution obtains, which is the 
Horst (1971) or centralized decision-making result, and then they split the gain according 
to their relative bargaining powers. 
If division general managements do not believe top management, a time-limit 
rule may encourage cooperation. Such a rule will not work, however, since division 
general managements remain ignorant of the fact that they face a positive-sum game. 
                                                     
25 This is an extreme case, since it is implicit that division general managements have an 
adversarial relationship. In practice, even though they have imperfect information, they know the 
nature of the internal dynamic in the corporation. The incentives to be a team player probably 
leads the stronger division general management to propose a less extreme transfer price, which 
tends to promote a cooperative solution even in the absence of perfect information. 
26 Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) argue that top management’s role of information assimilator does 
not undermine the firm’s decentralized decision-making structure, since “gathering and 
disseminating information does not constitute an infringement on the decision-making rights of 
divisional managers” (p. 88). 
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Another option is a non-monetary reward scheme.27 Division general managements 
receive a non-monetary reward, such as the use of the multinational corporation’s box 
seats at a popular event or the use of its time-share in a tropical vacation spot, when an 
agreement is reached.28 Under certain conditions, even though division general 
managements do not realize that the negotiation is a positive-sum game, the negotiation 
becomes a positive-sum game in their minds through the implementation of the non-
monetary reward scheme. 
As long as the weaker division general management expects that its gain from 
the non-monetary reward exceeds its loss from accepting the stronger division general 
management’s offer, cooperation occurs. Its expected loss is not the expected reduction 
in division after-tax profit, but rather the expected reduction in management 
compensation that occurs in response to the reduction in division after-tax profit. Since 
they have imperfect information, they may not succeed in choosing a transfer price on 
the arm’s-length boundary. If, by chance or educated guess, they succeed, a joint gain 
occurs after the first negotiation round. This indicates that their negotiation is a positive-
sum game, which promotes cooperation. Top management does not have to offer the 
non-monetary reward thereafter, since the realization of a joint benefit informs division 
general managements that they face a positive-sum game. Therefore, the negotiations 
possess a momentum of their own. On the other hand, if division general managements 
choose a transfer price further from the arm’s-length limit, they realize a joint loss, 
indicating that they should move the transfer price in the opposite direction in the next 
                                                     
27 A monetary reward scheme may work as well, but the profit-maximizing top management 
chooses the non-monetary reward because it has a lower marginal cost. 
 
28 The non-monetary reward, once received, may be subject to an income tax. 
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round. A trial-and-error process ensues, and the transfer price converges on the arm’s-
length boundary. 
The non-monetary reward scheme starts the cooperation in the first round, or in 
any subsequent round, only if the non-monetary reward provides enough utility gain to 
the weaker division general management to offset its expected compensation loss. If the 
non-monetary reward is not high enough, will top management raise the non-monetary 
reward to promote cooperation? Top management raises the non-monetary reward to 
the point where the expected marginal gain in NΠ  from cooperation is equal to the 
expected marginal loss in  from increasing the non-monetary reward. In sum, a 
cooperative solution is possible under imperfect information, and is more likely when top 
management either provides information to division general managements, uses a non-
monetary reward scheme, or division general managements discover by themselves that 
the negotiation is positive-sum. 
NΠ
IV. Results under the Possibility of Non-Compliance 
Throughout our analysis in Section III, we assume that the transfer pricing regulations 
are perfectly effective, so multinational corporations comply with them.29 The centralized 
and decentralized multinational corporations manipulate the transfer price within the 
arm’s-length range to lawfully minimize their global tax burden. In this section, we relax 
this assumption and consider the results under a weaker or less than perfectly effective 
arm’s-length constraint. This weaker arm’s-length constraint means that the centralized 
and decentralized multinational corporations might choose, either knowingly or 
                                                     
29 The arm’s-length constraint is effective when it successfully restricts the transfer price. The 
arm’s-length constraint may be effective but not binding for an individual multinational 
corporation. For example, a decentralized multinational corporation may choose a transfer price 
within the arm’s-length range due to internal constraints; the arm’s-length constraint is effective 
but not binding. 
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unknowingly, a transfer price that lies outside the arm’s-length boundary, which reflects 
non-compliance.  
The centralized multinational corporation chooses the transfer price at the 
highest or lowest allowable transfer price. Under tax compliance or an effective arm’s-
length constraint, the transfer price equals either the upper or lower arm’s-length 
boundary. With the possibility of non-compliance, the centralized multinational 
corporation’s transfer price is indeterminate. If it chooses non-compliance, how far 
outside the arm’s-length boundary does it set the transfer price? Kant’s (1988) analysis 
suggests a determinate solution under non-compliance. His analysis assumes that the 
multinational corporation believes that there is a certain and direct relationship between 
how far the transfer price is set outside the arm’s-length range and the likelihood of 
being caught by the tax authorities and a penalty being imposed. It also assumes that 
the dollar value of the penalty is known. The transfer price is determinate and chosen 
outside the arm’s-length boundary when the multinational corporation is not prohibitively 
risk averse. When the multinational corporation is unwilling to take the risk of being 
caught (or prefers to comply), it complies and sets the transfer price at the upper or 
lower arm’s-length boundary. 
Under an effective arm’s-length constraint, the decentralized multinational 
corporation might choose a transfer price within the arm’s-length range rather than on 
the arm’s-length boundary, since it faces an internal constraint (if the arm’s-length range 
is narrow and binding, it chooses the transfer price on the arm’s-length boundary). Under 
the possibility of non-compliance, the decentralized multinational may choose a transfer 
price within, on, or outside the arm’s-length boundary, depending on the slope of its 
internal demand and supply curves and the position of the arm’s-length boundary. Refer 
to Figure 3, which illustrates a non-compliant transfer price when the slope of the 
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demand (supply) curve is very steep and a compliant transfer price when the slope of 
the demand (supply) curve is relatively flat. 
By comparing the transfer price for the centralized versus the decentralized 
multinational corporation under the possibility of non-compliance, it is shown that the 
decentralized multinational is more likely to comply. This reflects the fact that the 
decentralized multinational corporation faces an internal constraint while the centralized 
multinational does not. Consider the case where both the centralized and the 
decentralized multinational corporation are identical in every way, except for the 
difference in decision-making structure. The centralized multinational that prefers not to 
comply chooses a transfer price that lies outside the arm’s-length boundary, while the 
decentralized multinational that prefers not to comply faces an internal constraint that 
leads to a transfer price that is closer to the arm’s-length boundary than the centralized 
multinational’s transfer price (see Figure 4) (except when the internal supply and 
demand curves are vertical). Therefore, under a less than perfectly effective arm’s-
length constraint, non-compliance is less probable for the decentralized multinational 
corporation than for the centralized multinational corporation, ceteris paribus, given that 
it faces an internal constraint. 
When the arm’s-length constraint is less than perfectly effective, non-compliance 
with the transfer pricing regulations is possible. Ceteris paribus, an industry that consists 
of both decentralized and centralized multinational corporations is more likely to comply, 
in general, than an industry that is comprised entirely of centralized multinational 
corporations. Therefore, the existence of decentralized multinational corporations in a 
particular industry leads to a higher average compliance rate than the industry that 
consists only of centralized multinational corporations. 
The decentralized decision-making model predicts that the range over which the 
profit-maximizing vertically integrated multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price 
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to shift profit is likely to be smaller than the centralized multinational corporation’s range. 
Thus, a country’s tax authorities may have less concern with the effect of international 
tax differentials on the profit-shifting behavior of decentralized multinational corporations 
than centralized multinational corporations. The decentralized vertically integrated 
multinational corporation has less room to maneuver the transfer price than the 
centralized multinational corporation, so the degree of compliance with the transfer 
pricing regulations is higher than predicted by Horst’s (1971) analysis. With greater 
compliance with the transfer pricing regulations and, in turn, a truer reported corporate 
profit, a country’s tax authorities collect more of the tax revenue that is legally due. 
This conclusion may not hold under negotiated transfer pricing, however, since 
the decentralized multinational corporation is more likely to choose the (perceived) 
highest or lowest allowable transfer price, the centralized decision-making result, rather 
than an interior solution. Therefore, a multinational industry that includes centralized 
multinational corporations, decentralized multinational corporations that practice 
centralized transfer pricing, and decentralized multinational corporations that practice 
negotiated transfer pricing, should have an intermediate compliance rate. 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper considers how the multinational corporation’s transfer price responds to 
changes in international tax rates. The centralized decision-making model produces a 
boundary solution for the transfer price, either at the upper or lower arm’s-length price, 
when the arm’s length constraint is perfectly effective. The decentralized decision-
making model may produce an interior solution not on the arm’s-length boundary, since 
the decentralized decision-making assumption specifies the quantity of intra-firm trade 
as a function of the transfer price. 
We first extend Bond’s (1980) model by completing the comparative static 
analysis. The results confirm our intuition that the profit-maximizing multinational 
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corporation uses the transfer price to shift profit to the relatively lower-tax country in 
order to maximize its global after-tax profit, all else equal. Also, the results apply to a 
wide range of relative tax rates. 
Under decentralized decision-making, the transfer price may lie within the arm’s-
length boundary, since the multinational corporation’s adjustment of the transfer price 
affects division output. Thus, since the decentralized multinational corporation may 
choose an interior transfer price, the degree of non-compliance by multinational 
corporations is less than that predicted by the centralized Horst (1971) model. In 
addition, the decentralized decision-making analysis shows that centralized decision-
making dominates decentralized decision-making when tax rates differ, but centralized 
decision-making is not generally applicable to the multinational corporation. 
We then extend the decentralized model by assuming negotiated transfer pricing. 
Bond (1980) assumes centralized transfer pricing, where top management chooses the 
transfer price and division general managements choose the quantity of intra-firm trade. 
Under negotiated transfer pricing, division general managements choose both the 
transfer price and the quantity of intra-firm trade. With perfect information, profit-
maximizing division general managements negotiate and choose both the firm-wide 
optimal output and transfer price. This result is consistent with Horst (1971), where the 
transfer price is a boundary solution. In contrast to Halperin and Srinidhi (1991), profit-
maximizing division general managements do not use the transfer price to divide the 
joint gain from cooperation. They must use alternative accounting to communicate their 
negotiated allocation of the profit gain to top management for compensation purposes. 
When division general managements have less than perfect information, top 
management first must persuade them to cooperate by telling them the negotiation is 
positive-sum or through a non-monetary reward scheme. As long as the relatively 
weaker bargaining division general management believes that the non-monetary reward 
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provides at least as much gain as its loss in management compensation, cooperation 
occurs. Through a trial-and-error process, division general managements eventually 
choose the firm-wide optimum transfer price, ceteris paribus. 
A comparison of centralized transfer pricing and negotiated transfer pricing 
reveals that the decentralized multinational corporation’s transfer price depends on who 
chooses it as well as the difference in international corporate tax rates (and other 
factors). Under both assumptions, the qualitative relationship between the transfer price 
and tax rates is the same – the multinational corporation uses it to shift profit to the low-
tax country. An interior solution is more likely under centralized transfer pricing, however, 
while the Horst (1971) solution – a boundary solution – is more likely under negotiated 
transfer pricing. In addition, the profit potential under negotiated transfer pricing is 
greater. Therefore, in the context of decentralized decision-making and different tax 
rates, top management weakly prefers negotiated transfer pricing to centralized transfer 
pricing. 
When the arm’s length constraint is less than perfectly effective, non-compliance 
is possible. In that case, the centralized multinational corporation’s transfer price is 
indeterminate. By including Kant’s (1988) assumptions, the centralized multinational 
corporation’s transfer price is determinate. The decentralized multinational corporation’s 
transfer price may lie outside the arm’s-length range, but it is likely to be closer to the 
arm’s-length boundary than the centralized multinational corporation’s transfer price, 
ceteris paribus. Therefore, the compliance rate in an industry with a higher proportion of 
decentralized multinational corporations should be higher. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Derivation of Results 
 
The total differential of top management’s first-order condition is: 
 
0][][][ 1221 =+−− dPCCdtBBdtAA , 
 
where ( )[ ]12'12'112 XXCPAA +−= , ( )[ ]12'1212'22 XXPPBB −−−= γ , and  
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ } −−+−−−+−+−−= ''1212'22''22'12'122''12'112''12'12'121 2121 XPPXXtXCPCXXtCC γγ
 
Assuming that the multinational corporation has linear marginal cost curves 
( ), 0''12
''
12
''
12 === XXX ds ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  −+−+−== 112 22'12''212'12''112'121 tXtXCttXDCC γ ) . From 
the first-order condition, the comparative static results are: 
 
11
*
12
D
AA
dt
dP =  and 
12
*
12
D
BB
dt
dP = . 
 
Appendix 2: Signing the Results 
 
Refer to the multinational corporation’s internal market (Figure 1). When top 
management sets the transfer price above (below) the equilibrium price,  
( ), and the multinational corporation is along the subsidiary’s demand (parent’s 
supply) curve and the relevant quantity is the quantity demanded (supplied) by the 
subsidiary (parent),  ( X ). When the multinational corporation is along 
the demand (supply) curve, the subsidiary’s (parent’s) first-order condition holds, 
0
1212 PP >
0
1212 PP <
dXX 1212 = sX1212 =
012 =P
'
112 −CP
'
22 −−P γ  ( P ), while the parent’s (subsidiary’s) first-order condition is 
positive,  (
0'1 =−C12
0> 012 >P'22 −−P γ ). Therefore, along the demand curve 
 ( )
0
1
12
'
12
'
112
1
*
12
12
<+−=
D
XXCP
dt
dP dd
X d
 and   (7d) 
0
1
12
2
*
12
12
>−=
D
X
dt
dP d
X d
,       (8d) 
 
and along the supply curve 
 
0
1
12
1
*
12
12
<=
D
X
dt
dP s
X s
 and     (7s) 
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( )
0
1
12
'
1212
'
22
2
*
12
12
>−−−=
D
XXPP
dt
dP ss
X s
γ ,    (8s) 
 
where  by the assumption that top management maximizes the multinational 
corporation’s global after-tax profit and thus the second-order condition for profit 
maximization holds.
01 <D
30  
 
Top management’s first-order condition is: 
 
0]))[(1(]))[(1( 12
'
1212
'
22212
'
12
'
1121
12
=−−−−++−−=Π XXPPtXXCPt
dP
d N γ , or 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) 011 1212'1212'22 12
'
12
'
112 >−
−=−−−
+−−
t
t
XXPP
XXCP
γ . 
 
The sign of the first-order condition in this form is positive, since 
( )
( ) 01
1
1
2 >−
−
t
t . 
 
When the firm is along the -curve, sX12 ( ) 0'112 =−CP  and ( ) 012'22 >−− PP γ , and 
the first-order condition reduces to: 
 
( ) 012'1212'22 12 >−−−
−
XXPP
X
γ . 
 
Therefore, ( )[ ] 012'1212'22 <−−− XXPP γ  in equation (8s). 
 
When the firm is along the -curve, dX12 ( ) 012'22 =−− PP γ  and ( ) 0'112 >−CP , and 
the first-order condition reduces to: 
 ( )[ ]
0
12
12
'
12
'
112 >−
+−−
X
XXCP . 
 
Therefore, ( )[ ] 012'12'112 >+− XXCP  in equation (7d). 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 In the linear supply and demand curves case, 01 <D  whether or not the second-order 
condition holds. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 012 22'1212'12''112'121 < −−+−= tXtXCttXD
0''2 >γ 0''1 >C
1 ''2+ γ , given increasing 
marginal costs ( , ), positive national tax rates that are less than one ( 0 11 << t , 
), and t  ( t ) when the MNC is along the  ( ) curve (see Appendix 3 for 
the derivation of these tax conditions). 
10 2 << t 21 t< 21 t> d12 sX 12X
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Appendix 3: The Tax Conditions 
 
In Appendix 2, we saw that when the multinational corporation is along its internal supply 
curve, top management’s first-order condition is: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 011 1212'1212'22 12 >−
−=−−−
−
t
t
XXPP
X
γ , 
 
where ( )[ ] 012'1212'22 <−−− XXPP γ  and ( ) 012'22 >−− PP γ . Therefore ( )( ) 111 12 >−− tt  and 
 when the multinational corporation is along the supply curve. 21 tt >
 
When the multinational corporation is along its internal demand curve, top 
management’s first-order condition is: 
 ( )[ ] ( )
( ) 01
1
1
2
12
12
'
12
'
112 >−
−=−
+−−
t
t
X
XXCP , 
 
where ( )[ ] 012'12'112 >+− XXCP  and ( ) 0'112 >−CP . Therefore ( )( ) 111 12 <−− tt  and t  when 
the multinational corporation is along the demand curve. 
21 t<
 
Appendix 4: The Critical Upper and Lower Transfer Prices 
 
When the multinational corporation is along its internal demand curve, equations (7d) 
and (8d) are the comparative static results. By top management’s first-order condition, 
since  in equation (8d), the profit-maximizing top management chooses a 
transfer price where  in equation (7d). Therefore, the 
optimal transfer price lies below the transfer price that makes 
012 <−= dXBB ( ) 012'12'112 > +−= dd XXCPAA
0=AA , where the price 
that makes  is the critical upper transfer price 0=AA ( )CUP12  (see Figure 2). Since BB  is 
always negative along the demand curve for the profit-maximizing multinational 
corporation, the multinational corporation is restricted to choosing a transfer price where 
 is positive; the optimal transfer price is not at or above . AA CU12P
 
When the multinational corporation is along its internal supply curve, equations 
(7s) and (8s) are the comparative static results. By the first-order condition, since 
 in equation (7s), the profit-maximizing multinational corporation only 
chooses a transfer price on the supply curve where 
012 >= sXAA ( ) 012'1212'22 < −−−= ss XXPPBB γ  in 
equation (8s). That is, the optimal transfer price is higher than a value that makes 
. The critical lower transfer price 0≥BB ( )CLP12 , then, is the transfer price that makes ( ) ss XXP 12'1212 −=−P '22 − γ , or 0=BB . 
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Figure 1: The Multinational Corporation’s Internal Market 
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Figure 2: The Critical Upper and Lower Transfer Prices 
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Figure 3: Decentralized Multinational Corporation Under The Possibility of 
Non-Compliance and Different Sloped Demand Curves 
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Figure 4: Centralized Versus Decentralized Multinational Corporation’s 
Transfer Price Under Non-Compliance 
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